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1. How can the social sciences be expected to differ
from physical sciences.
2. What is the science of common sense like?
3. Difficulties that AI has with common sense world in order
to show that common sense metaphysics has problems. The quasi-static
fully known entirely physical situation still suffers from the frame
problem.
4. Levels of necessity.
There is argument about whether belief "is" a predicate appcable
to sentences, and the general opinion seems to be that it "isn't".
We wish to avoid this controversy, and we will do so by studying
the relation between a "person" and a "sentence" and calling it
"belief". Thus we can study the relation between Fido and the
sentence "The bone is in his right hand", and the philosopher
who likes modal logic can study some other relation.
Nevertheless we should explain why we prefer to work with
sentences. Modal logic seems to require extensions to the basic
loic for each modal operator of belief, wishing, should, etc.
We want to work with all these concepts at once and in a fixed
logic. Therefore, we prefer a formulation in first order logic.
5. The world as an inverse limit of theories.